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I. Introduction  
Major changes in the political regime and decentralization strategy over the last few 
decades make Chile an interesting case-study of decentralization. Chile is a "narrow" 
nation covering almost three-hundred thousand square miles, ranging from coastal lands 
to the Andean mountain range. Its population is fairly homogeneous, concentrated in the 
central regions and metropolitan areas, with no substantial ethnic or cultural differences. 
The government has been unitary since political independence in 1810. There exists 
considerable variation in economic resources and production processes across regions, 
with agriculture, fishing, forestry, and mining the main industries.  
Chile's social and economic programs have a solid foundation that dates back to 1900, 
including long-term projects in housing and water supply. These programs were national 
in origin and quite independent of local authorities. Over the last three decades Chile has 
undergone radical changes in the structure of its government, including in the approach to 
decentralization. However, capturing the full effects of the changing scene in Chile is 
particularly difficult due to the fact that the most recent political changes occurred as 
recently as 1990 and some of the structures of the new democratic government are still 
being debated in the parliament. Throughout the various past regimes, Chilean national 
policy-makers have put a high value on health and education and have attained excellent 
results. For example, Chile's Human Development Index in 1990 stood eighth among 
developing countries (and first in Latin America), with a life expectancy of 72, an under 
five mortality rate of 25%, and adult literacy at 93% (Table 1 summarizes).  
Chile has experienced major changes in political regime in its recent history. Frei led the 
Christian Democratic government (with political roots dating back to the 19th century) until 1970, when he was voted out and replaced by Allende, a socialist. Allende was 
deposed by Pinochet in a military coup in 1973, and Pinochet ruled Chile under a highly 
repressive military regime until 1989. Democracy returned with Aylwin, a Christian 
Democrat, leading a coalition of center and left parties. Pinochet, however, retained 
control over the Army and some of the nation's policies via the considerable veto power 
of his parliamentary appointees.  
These dramatic political changes have been paralleled by changes in economic policy. 
The Frei regime followed an import-substituting industrialization policy, typical of Latin 
America at that time. That policy was accompanied by an expansionary monetary policy 
and a fairly high (but still tolerable) level of inflation. Allende pursued more populist 
policies, including large wage increases, which led to a high rate of inflation. That, and 
the attempted nationalization of foreign-owned copper companies, were the main factors 
that led to the military putsch by Pinochet. In a somewhat wavering way, Pinochet 
adopted monetarist, pro-market and open-economy policies favored by the "Chicago 
boys." The strict monetarism, accompanied by fixed exchange rates, proved stagnationist 
for many years, with growth of less than 1% throughout the 1970s and negative in the 
early 1980s. Inflation was reduced, but unemployment exploded (up to 17% in 1985). 
The poverty rate also rose sharply, from below 20% in 1970 to nearly 40% for much of 
the 1980s, with many of these problems exacerbated by fluctuating trade policies and 
downturns in the copper market. Beginning in 1986, however, there was a high rate of 
both output growth (4.4%) and natural resource-based export growth. Unemployment 
rates dropped dramatically (to 6%) and there are signs of a fall in poverty (Table 2). The 
shrinking of the economy in the early 1980s also led to an increase in the variance of 
regional per capita income and welfare that has not yet abated.1  
The various regimes also made changes in social policy that affected the nature and 
impact of decentralization in Chile. Under Frei and Allende, there existed a welfare state 
type of approach to social policy, with the objective of free and universal entitlement to 
state-provided health care and education. Pinochet introduced a radical change with 
emphasis on the private provision of health and education services, targeting state 
assistance to municipalities which fell below the poverty line. For primary and secondary 
education, a subsidy voucher system of government support was introduced on a per 
pupil basis, paid directly to the schools, whether public or in the private-subsidized 
sector, while state support for tertiary education was sharply reduced. In health, people 
were encouraged to opt out of the public system by paying contributions into private 
insurance groups. About 20% of the population chose to do this, especially among the 
upper income groups, removing nearly 50% of the financial burden from the public 
health system. During the 1980s, health charges were introduced in the public health 
system, with exemptions for poorer groups, mothers and young children. A complex 
program of inquiry into family circumstances, the questionnaires of the CAS (Comites de 
Asistencia Social) administered by the municipalities, permitted fairly efficient targeting 
of social assistance. This system, together with emergency employment schemes, 
prevented total destitution during periods of generally rising poverty and unemployment.  In what follows we review the changes in decentralization that have accompanied the 
changes in political regimes and some of their effects on various dimensions affecting the 
human condition. Section II provides an overview of the decentralization process, while 
Section III provides a more detailed discussion of the nature and extent of 
decentralization achieved, both under Pinochet and since, including changes in the 
system currently being instituted. Section IV assesses the qualitative and quantitative 
impact of these decentralization measures; Section V presents some conclusions.  
II. Decentralization and the structure of Government: An Overview  
The nature of Chilean decentralization over time was affected by changes in the political 
environment. During the democratic governments of Frei and Allende there were elected 
municipal councils and various neighborhood groups. These groups served as the base of 
popular participation in national affairs and often were organized around local and 
regional issues. Allende, for example, used local groups to advance social programs, 
especially the neighborhood food distribution program. While democratic structures were 
in existence at the municipal level under both Frei and Allende, the resource base of the 
municipalities was weak.  
Pinochet abolished all such democratic structures and replaced them with a military 
hierarchy in which centrally appointed intendentes were responsible for regions, 
governors headed provinces, and alcaldes (mayors) were responsible for municipalities. 
All appointees were named directly by the President and were loyal to the national 
government first, their area second. This effectively brought all municipalities under 
direct national control. All the intendentes and governors (and most of the mayors) came 
out of the military, and the clear aim of the new structure was to transmit commands from 
above most efficiently. 2 The provision of public services in Chile under Pinochet was 
intended to operate like a private market, with strong central control. Municipal-level 
tasks were privatized wherever possible and the streamlining of all levels of government 
became a primary goal. Municipal governments thus acted like 'service delivery agents,' 
providing local public service on a cost-effective basis, without having local governing 
power. This form of decentralization created a direct line of hierarchical control from 
Pinochet down throughout the nation, consistent with his political and macroeconomic 
agendas.  
Pinochet gave this new structure of government greater powers and resources, especially 
through the 1980s. The most important changes were the delegation of responsibility for 
primary and secondary education and primary health care to the municipalities, for which 
funds were transferred on a per capita basis. In addition, extra resources were provided to 
the municipalities through the property tax (via the Common Municipal Fund (FCM)), 
additional license income, and the transfer of investment resources through the Regional 
Development Fund (FNDR). 3 The resources owned by the municipalities thus increased 
significantly over the 1980s, although they remained a very small proportion of total 
government revenue (around 6%). The municipalities were, moreover, subject to strict 
central government guidelines and restrictions in terms of finance, were not permitted to 
run deficits, to have discretionary local tax control, or to take a significant role in local economic development. There were some redistributive features in the system of finance 
for both the municipalities and the regions. Among the municipalities this was achieved 
by the operation of the Fondo Comun Municipal and the Regional Development Fund. 
The Pinochet government also made considerable efforts to professionalize the staff of 
municipalities via increased training and objective hiring standards.  
The major change in decentralization achieved by the current democratic regime has been 
to institute elections for municipal councils and mayors (the first elections occurring in 
1992) and to give the municipalities additional finance. But the extent to which 
municipalities are free to raise additional funds is quite limited, and tax base inequalities 
raise distributional problems. There are additional proposals under consideration to 
strengthen and democratize the regional level of government. While the intendentes will 
continue to be appointed by the President, new regional councils will be elected by the 
municipal councils.  
The provincial level of government has been largely an irrelevance over the years. It has 
been retained in the recent reforms with an appointed Governor and an advisory council. 
However, it has neither significant powers nor any source of finance. Its influence is 
limited by the personality of its Governor and the proposals it makes to the regional 
government. It occasionally assists the regional government in administrative tasks or 
(rarely) coordinates municipal actions. Because of its limited influence, we ignore it 
throughout what follows.  
One observer summarized the changing scene at the local level as follows:  
Frei I  = democracy without modernization 
Piochet  = modernization without democracy 
Aylwin and Frei II  = modernization and democracy 
III. Specific structure of decentralization in Chile  
During the Pinochet rule, strict military-style control and an ideological desire to reduce 
the size of the state (through both decentralization and privatization) were the major 
motives for the somewhat odd combination of central control at the national level and 
decentralizing structures through the municipalities. At the same time, there were efforts 
by foreign-aid donors and NGOs to bypass the Pinochet structures, leading to a variety of 
specific funds. More recently, the democratization of government has led to a debate on 
the size, shape and resources of different levels of government which has focused on (a) 
the desirable level of political control at different levels; (b) the desire to provide a firm 
foundation for sustained democracy; and (c) the desirability of increased decentralization 
from the point of view of efficiency, equity, participation and accountability.  
In the more detailed description of the structure of government contained in this section, 
we highlight important differences between the Pinochet structure and the post-1990 
structure. The section is organized as follows: first, the administrative structure is discussed; second, the financial structure is analyzed; third, decentralization ratios are 
reviewed; fourth, we study changing human capacities at the local level; finally, we 
conclude with an assessment of the current state of decentralization and how proposed 
changes are likely to impact upon it.  
A. Administrative structures.  
The Pinochet regime established four tiers of government: the central government; 13 
regions (including the Santiago Metropolitan Region -- SMR), 51 provinces (with only 
nominal functions) and 325 municipalities. 4 The structure is summarized in Figure 1. 
This basic structure has been maintained, but with some changes, by the new democratic 
regime (Figure 2).  
A.1. Regions.  
The regions vary in size, population and income (Table 3). Population density differs 
from 0.7 persons per Km2 (XI) to 341 in the SMR; total population per region from 
80,000 (XI) to 5.2 million (SMR); income per capita from $791 (IX) to $3,431 (XII); and 
the number of people falling below a minimum consumption standard from 1.9 million 
(SMR) to 18,000 (XI).  
Each region is headed by an appointed intendente. Under Pinochet this was a military 
appointment, not necessarily made from within the region. In the Pinochet structure 
(Figure 1), the intendentes were advised by Regional Development Councils 
(COREDEs), which consisted of appointed representatives of local groups (including 
entrepreneurs and workers). Local representatives of the sectoral ministries (SEREMIs) 
helped formulate and execute decisions, while employees of the planning minister at the 
regional level (SERPLACs) evaluated project proposals.  
The Pinochet-appointed intendentes were replaced by Aylwin by civilians from within 
the regions (Figure 2). In 1993, the advisory councils were replaced by Regional 
Councils whose members are elected by municipal councillors, with responsibility for 
approving regional development plans and allocating the resources assigned for regional 
investment. Appointed social and economic advisory councils have been instituted at the 
provincial level, and the remaining structure of SEREMIs and SERPLACs at the regional 
level are unchanged. It should also be noted that all technical officials at the regional 
level remain employees of the central government and not of the regional governments.  
During Pinochet's reign, the main functions of the regional level of government were to 
consider regional investment decisions, especially the distribution of the FNDR, and to 
provide an efficient central mechanism to oversee the decisions of the municipal mayors. 
In theory, the new regional governments have much the same responsibility although 
their financial responsibilities have been extended to the programmes of Sectoral 
Regional Investment (ISAR).. In practice, differences will be manifested only if the 
regional government increases its control over resources. However, the "chain of 
command" aspect of the military regime -- from the President through the intendentes to the mayors -- has been weakened. The election of mayors responsible to the local 
councils and the electorate, not under the command of the President, has increased the 
probability of regional governments being able to take a significant role in fiscal matters.  
A.2 Municipalities.  
The municipalities, like the regions, display huge variance in size and socio-economic 
characteristics. Forty out of the 3345 have more than 100,000 inhabitants, while 200 have 
less than 20,000. The poor are disproportionately concentrated in the largest 
municipalities6 (Table 4).  
Although the municipalities were governed undemocratically under Pinochet, they had 
some autonomy in the sense that they were entitled to certain tax revenues which they 
could dispose of more-or-less as they pleased, subject to general guidelines. However, 
their officials, both with respect to particular functions and for project evaluation (the 
SECPLACs), were appointed by (and responsible to) the national government. The 
Pinochet regime provided some additional funds to the municipalities and delegated 
responsibility for primary health care and basic (primary and secondary) education to 
them. The municipalities were also made responsible for the poverty enquiry (CAS) and 
for administering a collection of poverty-relief programs, including the emergency 
employment program. Their other functions included the paving of urban and rural feeder 
roads, solid waste collection and disposal, public transportation, drainage, street lighting, 
parks and recreation, and public cemeteries.  
The post-1989 government has democratized the municipalities, providing for elected 
councils and mayors, 7 but retaining advisory social and economic councils consisting of 
representatives of interest groups. The basic functions of the municipalities remain 
unchanged, but their funds have been increased by a small amount and they have been 
given a limited amount of increased discretion over local tax rates.  
B. Financial structure.  
As noted above, the regional governments have no funds of their own, nor a budget, 
although they (especially through the SERPLACs) play a part in allocating the regional 
investment funds. The focus here, therefore, must be on the municipality.  
Historically, the municipalities have long had their own source of funds, varying from 
licenses to the sale of goods and services. This funding base brought in extremely little 
revenue and was regressively distributed, with wealthier municipalities having much 
more per capita resources than poorer ones. In 1977-79, the municipal share of total 
government revenues was just 2.5%. The Pinochet regime provided new revenue sources 
and changed the distribution of revenue among municipalities. Municipal governments, 
however, remained highly dependent on central government revenues. Some of 
Pinochet's innovations included:  i) From 1979 all revenue from the property tax was allocated to the municipalities (which 
had previously received only a fraction). To a certain extent this displaced the "aporte 
fiscal," a central government transfer to the municipalities which was sharply reduced in 
value, then phased out completely by 1986. This additional revenue from the property-
tax-cum-FCM was much greater than the aporte fiscal and accounted for 34% of revenue 
from the municipalities' own taxes and licenses in 1990, the biggest single source of 
revenue. This tax, however, was not under local control as both the tax rate and 
assessments were set by the central government.  
ii) In the previous system, both "own" revenue and finance from the central government 
varied with the wealth of the municipalities. Thus in 1974, the most wealthy 10% of the 
municipalities received 70% of the total income. 8 A system of redistribution among 
municipalities was introduced through the FCM. It was financed by 60% of the property 
tax, 50% of the vehicle tax in all municipalities, and a proportion of receipts from a tax 
on business in three high income municipalities. The FCM was distributed in accordance 
with a formula, including a flat rate per municipality, the number of inhabitants per 
municipality, the number of exemptions from the property tax (a poverty indicator since a 
flat rate value of property determines exemption), and a proportion according to the 
shortfall of municipality income from average municipality income. The remaining 10% 
of the FCM was conditionally allocated to municipalities with emergency deficits. This 
fund has been an effective means of redistributing revenue from communities with a 
strong tax base and targeting those with a weak tax base.  
iii) Funds to finance basic education, health and social assistance were transferred with 
the transfer of responsibility for these services during the 1980s. The funds for social 
assistance exactly matched the expenditures. In education, a flat rate subsidy per pupil 
was paid, but the real value of these subsidies fell quite sharply over the 1980s. 9 Health 
payments were made in accordance with specified services provided. Major municipal 
deficits emerged due to the reduced real value of the education subsidy and the 
accompanying privatization which removed pupils (and their subsidies) from the 
municipal schools while costs did not fall proportionately. In health, the main problem 
was a ceiling imposed on total expenditures in 1983, while health services expanded and 
the real value of government finance again fell. 10 The 'flat' payments to cover health and 
education expenditures were meant to provide local government with an incentive to 
control costs. However, these reimbursements did not, in the aggregate, cover actual 
costs. This caused an acute financial squeeze on the municipalities, who had to use some 
of their "own" funds reallocated from other investment and operating areas to finance 
health and education. Some municipalities also ran deficits, although in principle these 
were prohibited. Ways of financing deficits included using a portion of the FCM reserved 
for emergencies and petitioning for special funds established by the Pinochet 
Government. Since 1990, there have been occasional overtures to the Finance Ministry, 
which has funded deficits in a few cases but has simultaneously applied "IMF-
conditionality" to the municipalities to discourage repetitions.  
iv) The Pinochet regime also initiated a flow of funds for investment, the most important 
being the Regional Development Fund (established in 1975) amounting to 15% of the public sector investment budget (largely financed by the IDB). This fund finances new 
investment projects in health, education and minor infrastructure, such as rural roads, and 
is distributed in response to project submissions by the municipalities and regions. The 
projects are subject to an appraisal by the planning ministry. Small projects can be 
evaluated and approved at the regional level, but projects above about U.S. $200,000 
must be analyzed by the center. Redistributive criteria, including the population size and 
the inverse of per capita income of the area, in principle determine the regional 
distribution of the funds, but they are not always applied in practice. 90% of the Fund is 
allocated to five areas: basic education, basic health, sanitation, rural roads, and small 
urban roads. The remainder is discretionary and can be spent on a wide range of projects.  
v) Other investment funds for use by municipalities -- with varying degrees of local 
control -- were set aside for neighborhood improvement, urban improvement, communal 
equipment, sanitation, pavements, and sports. Each program is designed to cover a 
particular type of activity or need. The Regional Fund is probably most responsive to 
municipal submissions, although both regional and central government play a critical role 
(Figure 3). For some of the funds, the role of the municipality is quite marginal: for 
example, in the neighborhood improvement fund, the role of the municipality is confined 
to identifying poor areas, with priorities set at the regional level. 11 Municipalities 
typically are only responsible for execution of the projects.  
Proposed changes in the financing system include a revaluation of the property tax 
(including an increase in the exemption level), discretion to the municipalities to alter the 
rate of the property tax between 1.1% to 1.6% (with municipalities charging less than 
1.6% having their FCM reduced proportionately), removal of a ceiling on the business 
tax, and small changes in the formula for distribution of the FCM (the most important 
being the inclusion of the percentage of uneducated mothers and child malnutrition as 
criteria). It is expected that these changes will increase municipal own revenue by 20-
30%, giving more to larger/more developed municipalities. 12  
A new scheme initiated at the regional level, known as ISAR, allows the transfer of a 
small proportion (up to 5%) of the investments of sectoral ministries to the regional 
governments at their request. Programmes transferred under the ISAR mechanism 
include rural and urban roads and pavements, neighbourhood schemes and potable water 
as well as various projects of the Social Investment Fund (FOSIS). The Regional Fund 
(FNDR) is to increase by 25% above the increase in total public sector investment each 
year over four years, with some of the additional funds to be spent by the regional 
governments rather than the municipalities. Thus the proposals give more investment 
resources to the region, but none of them are totally under regional control; the regional 
governments still lack any source of current expenditure.  
As can be seen from Tables 6 and 7, the municipalities are heavily dependent on outside 
money, especially for investment finance. "Own" revenue, including taxes and FCM, 
accounts for 57% of the total budget revenue of the municipalities. But the municipalities 
only finance an estimated 16% of the investment in their area, an amount which just 
exceeds the contribution of the various external funds. Both are dwarfed by the expenditures of the central ministries, which account for nearly 70% of the investment in 
the regions. One future consideration which may alter the central government/municipal 
fiscal transfer relationship concerns the FCM. Its redistributive nature was 'set in stone' 
under the strict rule of Pinochet, but this could be subject to resistance with the increased 
democratization of local government.  
Overall, Chile faces a large local revenue dilemma, as per-capita municipal revenues vary 
by a factor of more than 100 to 1 among the cities alone (the variance is even higher 
when rural municipalities are included). This implies that merely assigning discretionary 
tax control to municipal governments will not alleviate the built-up fiscal pressures and 
will only increase the variance in municipal welfare. Correcting the inequalities inherent 
in local tax bases -- by some system of transfer from the central government -- must be a 
major part of any decentralization effort granting more power to the municipal 
governments.  
C. Decentralization Ratios.  
Revenue and expenditure decentralization ratios were very low in Chile before the 
reforms of the 1980s: only 2.3% of total government revenue was raised by municipal 
taxes and the municipalities were responsible for an even smaller proportion of total 
expenditure (less than 2%, see Table 8). The financial autonomy ratio was high, however, 
at 0.92, indicating the small amount of government transfers to the municipalities. 
Revenue and expenditure ratios increased sharply during the 1980s: municipal revenue 
rose to 6% of total government revenue by 1988, and if health and education are 
included, the expenditure ratio rose to almost 8.3% The financial autonomy ratio fell 
sharply since health and education are financed by transfers from the central government. 
In 1990, the municipalities financed 60% of their activities from their own resources. 
However, there was some decline in the decentralization ratios between 1988 and 1990.  
The transfer of responsibilities for education and health to the municipalities led to a 
sharp increase in the sectoral decentralization ratios, especially in education where, by 
1988, the municipalities were responsible for one quarter of government expenditure 
(Table 9) falling back to around one fifth by 1990. In health, the proportion was only 
3.2% in 1990, reflecting the low proportion of health resources devoted to primary health 
care, the responsibility of the municipalities. The infrastructure decentralization ratio rose 
from just over 2% in 1977 to nearly 25% in 1988 and 39% in 1990, reflecting the 
increase in municipalities' investments accompanying their increase in financial 
resources.  
D. Human Capacities at the Local Level.  
A major thrust of Pinochet policies was to "professionalize" the municipalities, increasing 
their qualified personnel and reducing the numbers of unqualified employees. The 
expected efficiency gains from a smaller, but better trained and paid, staff led to this 
decision, as local governments were considered overstaffed and poorly managed. The 
reductions occurred by national edict via the 1976 Municipalities Act. This change in personnel composition became especially important as new functions were transferred to 
the municipalities and as access to resources from the special funds became dependent 
upon the presentation of good projects to the national funding agencies. The career 
structure of municipal employees was improved through increased training and tenure. 
Part of the professionalization consisted of heavy emphasis on cost-benefit analysis by 
SECPLAC and SERPLAC personnel, with training provided by the central government. 
Other types of training were provided by the municipalities, with support from external 
agencies.  
Municipalities were encouraged to restrict total employment by a rule which put a 
maximum of 35% on personnel costs in the municipal budget (not including health and 
education) and a ceiling on the ratio of municipal employees to population. One of the 
biggest changes brought about by Pinochet at the municipal level was the greatly reduced 
role of the local government as an employer of unskilled labor (excluding the emergency 
employment schemes which temporarily re-employed many of those who lost their 
municipal jobs). The overall aim was to encourage the contracting out of services to the 
private sector.  
Aggregate figures suggest that the increased professionalization of local government 
employees was effective. Professional and technical staff rose from 8% to 33% from 
1975 to 1988, a rise almost exactly offset by the fall in auxiliary (untrained) employees 
(Table 10). Overall, municipal employment fell 15% from 2.01 per thousand in 1975 to 
1.72 per thousand in 1988.  
While the professionalization of the municipal personnel occurred across the board, there 
is still a large discrepancy in human capacities among municipalities, with smaller/poorer 
municipalities much weaker than larger/richer ones. Of the total, 118 municipalities are 
estimated to have "low" economic management capacity, 134 "medium" and 73 
"high".13 The worst concentration of low capacity is found in Regions IV, VII and VIII 
(over 60% with low capacity). These regions all have below average per capita incomes 
and above average poverty rates (Table 3). Exceptionally good capacity is found in 
Regions I and III (both regions have above average per capita incomes, but III has a high 
poverty rate).  
E. Assessment of the Current Extent of Decentralization.  
In making this assessment, we adopt the accepted distinction between deconcentration 
(central government posts employees at the local level), delegation (central government 
delegates its powers to representatives at the local level), and devolution (the central 
government completely cedes powers to local decision-makers). 14  
There was minimal decentralization during the Frei/Allende administrations, shown by 
the few functions and very limited resources available to the municipalities. The small 
amount there was can be described as constrained devolution. The municipalities were 
autonomous units with elected governments, responsible to the local electorates and not to the central government. However, they were heavily constrained by limitations on their 
tax powers and functions.  
The Pinochet period showed a major increase in decentralization, as indicated by the new 
functions and resources assigned to the municipalities and regions. This decentralization 
was strictly deconcentration and delegation, as abolishing the elected authorities at 
municipal levels eliminated all elements of devolution. Officials at every level were 
appointed by (and responsible to) the President. Constraints were imposed on the use of 
resources (e.g. employment restrictions), and the new investment funds involved strong 
central influence. A variety of central rules was imposed on local government decisions 
regarding education and health. For example, the curriculum was determined centrally, 
textbooks were produced centrally, and health services were required to impose user 
charges.  
The democratic government has reinstituted elements of devolution at the municipal level 
with the general election of mayors and councils. Moreover, it has sustained the resource 
improvements of the Pinochet era, and present proposals will further increase both own-
funds of the municipality by 20 to 30% and the size of the Regional Fund. Thus, current 
decisions appear to maintain and even increase the decentralization of the 1980s, while 
transforming the previous deconcentration/delegation into devolution. The devolution 
remains constrained, however, as the municipalities have been permitted to vary taxes by 
only a very small amount and with penalties if the property tax rate falls below or above a 
certain rate. Resource access is still limited by central government decisions. There is no 
change in the operation of the Regional Fund to give more control to the municipalities, 
and the municipalities may lose resources to the regional governments. Finally, no 
significant relaxation of central rules on the municipal use of own-funds or in the 
education and health sectors is being contemplated.  
The democratic government proposes to strengthen the regional level of government by 
providing resources through the Regional Fund and ISAR, and by democratizing (albeit 
indirectly) the Regional Councils. Both sources of funds are subject to heavy central 
control, as all large projects for the Regional Fund go to the central level while ISAR 
funds are allocated to specific areas. The regional governments will have annual budgets 
but no independent source of funds, only annual central government transfers.  
The intendentes for now remain Presidential appointments, with the difficult dual role of 
representing the President in the region and heading the regional government. The 
intendente's "cabinet" consists of regional representatives of the sectoral ministries and a 
project evaluation staff which will be based in the Planning Ministry. The regional 
governments have no actual employees of their own. The powers of the Regional 
Councils are confined to rejecting/reducing (not increasing) the regional budget. The 
regional government proposed thus represents constrained delegation, with limited 
financial powers. However constrained, it can be interpreted as an increase in 
decentralization of the delegation kind. If the changes take resources and/or functions 
away from the municipal level, they are a backward step from the perspective of 
decentralization. This is likely to be true to some extent of the use of the enlarged Regional Fund. In contrast, if the new resources are at the expense of central government 
ministries, (i.e. ISAR), they increase the extent of decentralization.  
In summary, the pre-1974 situation of very limited devolution was replaced by increased 
decentralization of a deconcentration/delegation type. Constrained devolution has 
recently been reintroduced at a much more significant level in terms of resources and 
functions than pre-1974. However, changes at the regional level remain ambiguous in 
their effect; they involve increases in delegation but may do so at the expense of the 
powers and resources of the much more autonomous municipalities.  
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